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The Security for Costs Requirement in
California-A Violation of Procedural Due
Process?
"Security for costs" has been defined as a "[a] security which a
defendant in an action may require. . for payment of such costs
as may be awarded to the defendant."' A plaintiff, or in some
cases an appellant, may be required to provide the security for
costs 2 as a condition precedent to his or her access to the court
system. The purpose of the security for costs is two-fold: (1) to
provide protection for a defendant by ensuring an available fund
to defray costs incurred by the defendant in defending a frivolous
claim, and (2) to discourage the filing of unmeritorious and frivo-
lous claims.3
Recently, several California statutes which require a security
for costs have been attacked 4 on the basis of constituting an un-
constitutional violation of the procedural due process require-
ments of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Federal
1. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 416 (4th ed. rev. 1970). A "security for costs"
may take the form of an "undertaking" or the deposit of a sum of money or bearer
bonds. See note 2 infra. For purposes of this Comment, "security for costs" will
be the phrase utilized exclusively as it is inclusive of an "undertaking," whereas
an "undertaking" is not inclusive of a "security for costs."
2. The actual form of the security for costs may vary according to California
procedure. The statutes which dictate such a security requirement usually call for
an "undertaking." CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §1041 (West 1955) provides the simplified
procedure: "Whenever a party to an action or proceeding desires to give an under-
taking provided to be given by any statute of this State, it shall be sufficient if the
sureties sign an undertaking to be given. Such undertaking may be in form as fol-
lows: [suggested form omitted]." Regarding the qualifications of the sureties, see
2 WrrKIN, CALFORNIA PROCEDURE, PROVISIONAL REMEDIES §3, 1466-68 (2d ed. 1970).
In all civil cases, wherein an undertaking is required, the party required to
furnish such undertaking may, in lieu thereof, deposit... (a) [a] sum of
money... equal to the amount required to be secured by said undertak-
ing; or, (b) [blearer bonds or bearer notes . .. having a market value at
least equal to the amount of the corporate surety bond otherwise required
or permitted to be furnished,...
CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §1054a (West Supp. 1978).
3. See, e.g., VAN ALYSTYNE, CALIFORNmI GOVERNMENT TORT LIABU.xrY, 784-86,
801-2 (1964); Brandt v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 437, 62 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1967); Bried
v. Superior Court, 11 Cal 2d 351, 79 P. 2d 1091 (1938).
4. See note 11 infra.
Constitution 5 and corresponding sections of the California Con-
stitution.6 The gist of the argument is that by requiring a plaintiff
or appellant to provide a security for costs without a prior hearing
addressing the necessity of such a security or the amount re-
quired, that party has been subjected to an unconstitutional "tak-
ing."7
Several California court decisions8 have adopted this line of
reasoning. The purpose of this comment is to analyze and cri-
tique the California courts' application of procedural due process
reasoning in holding these statutes unconstitutional. 9
Initially it is necessary to develop the California position. Next,
the decisions are discussed emphasizing the impropriety of a pro-
cedural due process analysis. Finally, the effect of these innova-
tive decisions on the security for costs requirement in such
summary remedies as the preliminary injunction or temporary re-
straining order, and whether the security for costs requirement
will remain a viable means of protecting an otherwise vulnerable
defendant, will be discussed.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall . .. be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §1 pro-
vides: " . . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
6. CAL. CONST. art. I §7 1849, amended 1974 provides: "(a) A person may not
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law or denied equal
protection of the laws."
7. The term "taking" has a multi-variant application as a legal word of art and
is perhaps misapplied in the context of the law which is the topic of this comment.
The term "taking" does not appear in either the Federal or California Constitu-
tions' due process clauses, other than as used in the fifth amendment concerning
eminent domain proceedings. Rather, the Federal and California Constitutions
provide that a person shall not be deprived of property without due process of
law. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
The term "taking" as used in a procedural due process context signifies that a
person is deprived of a protected interest. The consequences of establishing a
"taking" is that appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard must be provided
or the taking is unconstitutional. See generally NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CON-
STrruTIoNAL LAw, 490-92 (1978).
8. See note 11 infra.
9. It must be noted that this line of reasoning was not necessitated by a de-
sire to protect indigent litigants who could not afford the cost of a security for
costs requirement. California courts have common law authority to dispense with
fees in the case of indigent litigants, and "under proper circumstances California
courts do have power to dispense with bond requirements intended to protect an
adversary's financial interest." Conover v. Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842, 850-51, 114 Cal. Rptr.
642, 647, 523 P.2d 682, 687 (1974). See also County of Sutter v. Superior Court, 244
Cal. App. 2d 770, 53 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1966).
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I. SYNOPSIS OF CALIFORNIA LAW 10
With the advent of recent decisions in California," it is ques-
tionable whether statutes which require a party to file a security
for costs for the protection of another party are likely to with-
stand a procedural due process attack. The California Supreme
Court decisions 12 have established strong precedent and the ap-
pellate courts are now following suit.'3
The cases recognize a "two-fold taking"14 of property whenever,
on an ex parte motion, a party is forced to post security for the
protection of another's costs in defending a claim.15 On the one
hand, if the security requirement is complied with, a taking oc-
curs in either the deprivation of the use of money,16 occuring
where money is deposited in lieu of an undertaking, or in the loss
of a nonrefundable premium,17 such as where a surety has been
10. The following is merely a brief exposition of the law as developing in
California. For a more detailed discussion of the law as applied to the security for
costs, see Comment, Due Process and Security for Expense Statutes: An Analysis
of California Statutes in Light of Recent Trends, 7 PAC. L.J. 176 (1976).
11. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785
(which held CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §117 an unconstitutional taking without due
process of law. Section 117 requires an undertaking when appealing a judgment in
small claims court prior to a hearing with right of counsel.) Nork v. Superior
Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 977, 109 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1973) (holding CAL. Crv. P]Roc. CODE
§1029.6(e), which requires an undertaking in a medical malpractice suit for exem-
plary damages, an unconstitutional "taking" of property); Beaudreau v. Superior
Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975) (which held CAL. GOV'T
CODE §§947, 951 requiring an undertaking to prosecute a lawsuit against a public
entity or employee, an unconstitutional two-fold taking of a protected property in-
terest); Allen v. Jordano's, Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 160, 125 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1975) (hold-
ing CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §830, which requires an undertaking in prosecuting a
defamation action, an unconstitutional violation of procedural due process rights);
and Gonzales v. Fox, 68 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 137 Cal. Rptr. 312 (Dep't. Super. Ct.
1977) (holding CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE §1030, which imposes a security requirement
on non-residents seeking access to California courts in order to prosecute a claim,
constitutes an unconstitutional "taking.")
12. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785
(1973); Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 588
(1975).
13. Nork v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 977, 109 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1973); Allen
v. Jordano's Inc. 52 Cal. App. 3d 160, 125 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1975); Gonzales v. Fox, 68
Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 137 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1977).
14. A "two-fold taking" should have a neutral connotation. It merely signifies
that a taking occurs in either of two ways. It is not a more reprehensible taking
because it is a "two-fold taking" as compared to a "taking."
15. See Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585 (1975).
16. Id. at 455, 535 P.2d at 717, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
17. Id.
employed. In the latter case, there is also the loss of enjoyment
or use of collateral which is often required in order to qualify for
a bond.18 If the security requirement is not complied with, how-
ever, the second aspect of a taking occurs and is found in the dis-
missal of a "meritorious" claim.19
Regarding the deprivation of the use of money, the court's have
relied heavily on recent United States Supreme Court decisions
which have held summary garnishment procedures 20 and pre-
judgment replevin statutes 21 unconstitutional in holding that the
deprivation of the use of money, for no matter how brief a period,
constitutes a taking for which procedural due process protections
must be afforded. Brooks v. Small Claims Court,22 which was the
initial case to apply a procedural due process analysis in this con-
18. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d at 667, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105 Cal.
Rptr. at 789 (1973).
19. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 457, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 590.
20. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
22. 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973). Brooks is reviewed in
Note, Application of Procedural Due Process Standards to Small Claims Court
Judgement Appeal Bond Requirement, 62 CALF. L. REv. 421 (1974).
The facts of Brooks are briefly as follows. Defendant sought to appeal a money
judgment entered against her by the small claims court. As a prerequisite to ap-
peal, former CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§117 (repealed by 976 Cal. Stats. ch. 1289, §1) &
1171 (repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 266 §3) required defendant to furnish an un-
dertaking or a security for costs deposit. Defendant filed notice of appeal without
complying with the code sections, arguing the requirements would unconstitution-
ally deprive her of her property before she could obtain a due process hearing
with the right of representation by counsel. Defendant had sought but was re-
fused permission to be represented by counsel at small claims court. Defendant's
appeal was dismissed because of the noncompliance. Defendant then filed a peti-
tion for a writ of mandate to compel respondent to allow her to appeal the adverse
judgment without being required to file the undertaking prescribed by law.
The court issued the preemptory writ of mandate, holding the statutes requiring
an undertaking or deposit in lieu of an undertaking void as an unconstitutional
taking under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution since appel-
lant was summarily deprived of a protected property interest.
The court's reasoning was two-fold. First, the court noted "the concept of a 'tak-
ing' has been extended significantly." 8 Cal. 3d at 666, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105 Cal.
Rptr. at 789 (1973). Secondly, the court "discern[ed] compelling policy reasons
supportive of [the] conclusion." Id. at 668, 504 P.2d at 1254, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
The court cited empirical studies indicating that "the institutional creditor, rather
than the ordinary individual claimant, is more likely to avail itself of the small
claims court." Id. at 669, 504 P.2d at 1254, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 790. Institutional credi-
tors are likely to become proficient in use of the small claims court to the disad-
vantage of the poor litigant. Id. Thus there is a need for the defendant to have
"access to counsel without being required to first fie an undertaking." Id.
Whether or not the Court found an unconstitutional taking in the security for
costs requirement of former CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §§117 and 1171 because of com-
pelling policy reasons is now merely academic. The possible constitutional infir-
mity of the security for costs requirements is now well-established. See note 11
supra.
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text, relied heavily on Fuentes v. Shevin23 in asserting that "any
significant taking is within the purview of the Due Process
Clause."24 The court viewed the deprivation of the use of money
required as an undertaking or security for costs as such a signifi-
cant taking, and recognized a basic right to a hearing regarding
the deprivation. That the amount may be inconsequential is of lit-
tle moment.25
Beaudreau v. Superior Court26 elaborated the second aspect of
the two-fold taking, the dismissal of a "meritorious action." The
Beaudreau court liberally interpreted the language of Board of
Regents v. Roth that "[to have a property interest in a benefit, a
person must clearly have more than an abstract need or desire for
it... He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
it."27 A meritorious action was held to connote a "legitimate claim
of entitlement," and thus a protected Iroperty interest.2 8 The
court held:
If the plaintiff [does not file the demanded undertakingi and incurs dis-
missal of his action, he will have suffered a "taking" of his property, since
his claim against a public entity or employee-assuming that it is bona
fide and potentially meritious-is a "property interest" within the mean-
23. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes held the Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment
replevin statutes, which permitted a private party to obtain a prejudgment writ of
replevin through a summary process of an ex parte application to a court clerk,
invalid under the fourteenth amendment since they work a deprivation of prop-
erty without due process by denial of the right to be heard before chattels are
taken from the possessor.
It is the author's position that Fuentes has been misapplied by the California
courts, and that the California decisions under discussion have gone beyond the
reasoning underlying Fuentes. See discussion below part H, B, 1.
24. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d at 667-68, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105 Cal.
Rptr. at 789, citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 86.
25. In Brooks, the Court noted the amounts protected by Sniadach and its
California progeny involved a range as low as $63.18.
26. 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975). In Beaudreau, plain-
tiffs sought to prosecute a claim against a school district and public employees.
Defendants demanded that plaintiffs post undertakings in an amount approximat-
ing $25,000 as security for costs which might be awarded defendants. In a manda-
mus proceeding, the California Supreme Court held CAL. Gov'r CODE §§947 & 951,
which required the security for costs, an unconstitutional "taking" because notice
and a hearing were not held before the taking.
The court noted that "the taking to which a plaintiff is subjected under the
above statutes must be preceded by a hearing in the particular case in order to
determine whether the statutory purpose is promoted by the imposition of the un-
dertaking requirement." Id. at 460, 535 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
27. Id at 456, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
28. Id. at 457, 535 P.2d 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
ing of the due process clause.
2 9
In finding a "taking," the decisions have relied strongly on Snia-
dach v. Family Finance Corp.30 as marking a significant depar-
ture into the burgeoning realm of applying procedural due
process limitations to the field of summary remedies. 31 In fact,
the decisions summarily dismiss the taking issue by such lan-
guage as "[ul nder Sniadach and its progeny.., this is of course
a taking."32 These decisions are consistent with the application of
the Sniadach rationale in other California decisions. 33
Having found a "taking" the decisions note as a "basic proposi-
tion that in every case involving a deprivation of property within
the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution requires
some form of notice and a hearing."34 And, "[a]bsent extraordi-
nary circumstances justifying resort to summary procedures, this
hearing must take place before an individual is deprived of a sig-
29. Id. 456, 535 P.2d 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590, citing Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
30. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Sniadach held the Wisconsin prejudgment garnish-
ment procedure, which allowed a summons to be issued at the request of the cred-
itor's lawyer causing wages to be frozen pending trial of the main suit,
unconstitutional as providing for no right to be heard as to the legitimacy of the
garnishment before the wages were frozen. Sniadach has been the subject of
countless law review articles, and is generally viewed as a landmark case in the
area of summary procedure.
31. Indicative of the sacrosanct attitude toward Sniadach is the following lan-
guage from Nork v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1001, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428, 431
(1973):
We would preliminarily observe that just as Mapp v. Ohio (citation de-
leted) created ever enlarging waves which eroded many time-honored
precedents in the field of searches and seizures and Brown v. Board of
Education (citation deleted) did likewise in the civil rights field so has
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (citation deleted) wrought many
changes in the field of summary remedies.
32. Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d at 667, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105 CaL
Rptr. at 789; Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 455, 535 P.2d at 717, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 589 (citations deleted).
33. See, e.g., McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669,
(1970) (prejudgment attachments); Cllne v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley, 1
Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970) (also prejudgment attachments);
Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) (claim and
delivery statutes); Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 145
(1974) (garagemen's liens), Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (dis-
traint statutes); Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553
P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976), appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 1056 (1977) (mechan-
ics' lien recognized as a taking, but statute upheld); Randone v. Appellate Dep't.
of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (attachment
and garnishment).
34. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 458, 535 P.2d at 719, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 591, citing North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601
(1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. 416 U.S. 600
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
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nificant property interest."35
Precisely what standard of review is required is never fully ad-
dressed, other than that the hearing must be "meaningful" and
"appropriate to the nature of the case,"36 although the Beaudreau
court did note that "[ilt is a proposition which hardly seems to
need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of
an element essential to the decision does not meet this stan-
dard."37 The procedure devised in California Corporations Code
Section 83438 was cited as a possible model in Nork v. Superior
Court.3 9 This procedure provides for notice and a hearing prior to
setting the amount of security required, thereby enabling the
court to fix the nature and amount of the security based upon the
probable reasonable expenses which will be incurred in defend-
ing the suit.40
In Gonzales v. Fox,41 the court noted that Beaudreau sets forth
three procedural safeguards which must be afforded. Specifically,
there must be a "meaningful pretaking hearing which will allow
inquiry into: (1) the validity of the claim; (2) the reasonableness
of the amount of the bond to be posted, and inferentially, the rea-
sonableness of not requiring any bond; and (3) the ability of a
person to furnish a bond."42
Applying the above criteria, several statutes have been held un-
constitutional43 under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
35. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 458, 535 P.2d at 719, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 591.
36. Id.
37. Id., citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971). The Beaudreau court
noted that since the statutes which were under attack "are purportedly designed
to protect public entities and public employees against the cost of defending frivo-
lous lawsuits, a due process hearing would necessarily inquire into the merit of
the plaintiff's action as well as into the reasonableness of the amount of the under-
taking in light of the defendant's probable expenses," Beaudreau, 14 Cal. 3d at 460,
535 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
38. CAL. CORP. CODE §834 was repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 682, §6, effective
Jan. 1, 1977. The equivalent of §834 is now CAL. CORP. CODE §800 (West 1977) ad-
ded by 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 682, §7 effective Jan. 1, 1977.
39. 33 Cal. App. 3d 977, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1973).
40. CAL CORP. CODE §800 (West 1977). See note 38 supra.
41. 68 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 137 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1977).
42. Id. at 18, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
43. These include former CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §1771 (West 1954) (which re-
quired an undertaking in connection with appeal from a small claims court judg-
ment [repealed by 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 266, §31); CAI CIV. PRoc. CODE §830 (West
1955) (requiring an undertaking in a medical malpractice suit for exemplary dam-
ages); CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE §1030 (West 1955) (imposing a security requirement
on nonresident plaintiffs); CAL. Gov'r CODE §947 (West Supp. 1978) (requiring an
Federal Constitution, and corresponding sections of the California
Constitution.4 4 The statutes have the following in common. On
an ex parte motion, a party prosecuting a claim, or seeking appel-
late review of an adverse judgment, must file a security for costs,
or suffer dismissal of the claim or appeal. No procedure is pro-
vided which will allow a prior hearing to determine the costs
likely to be incurred, the legitimacy of the claim, or the ability of
the plaintiff or appellant to comply with the requirement. Nor are
there sufficient "extra-ordinary circumstances" to warrant a post
deprivation hearing. Doubtless, other statutes having the same
characteristics are prone to attack.45
The decisions which have held the statutes constitutionally in-
firm46 have established strong precedent. In the most recent
case,47 the court of appeal summarily held that California Code of
Civil Procedure Section 1030, requiring a nonresident plaintiff to
post a security for costs as a prerequisite to access to the Califor-
nia judicial system, falls within the criteria of Beaudreau, and is
thus unconstitutional. Additionally, the California Supreme Court
has cited Brooks and Beaudreau in its discussion of other proce-
dural due process cases.48
II. IMPROPRIETY OF THE CALIFORNIA DECISIONS
A. Irrebuttable presumption analysis as the possible foundation
of the decisions
While the California cases 49 are purportedly based on procedu-
ral due process reasoning, there is a strong indication that they
actually rely on an irrebutable presumption analysis.50 An ir-
undertaking in order to prosecute suit against a government entity); and CAL.
GOV'T CODE §951 (West Supp. 1978) (requiring an undertaking in order to prose-
cute action against a government employee).
44. Thus because of independent and adequate state grounds the decisions
are not reviewable by the United States Supreme Court. But see Brooks v. Small
Claims Court, note 18 supra, which was based solely on an application of the four-
teenth amendment. Respondent did not appeal the decision to the United States
Supreme Court, however.
45. A discussion of the effects of security for costs required prior to the issu-
ance of preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders is below part III.
46. See note 11 supra.
47. Gonzales v. Fox, 68 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 137 Cal. Rptr. 312.
48. See, e.g., Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 535
P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477; T.M. Cobb Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 16 Cal. 3d 606,
547 P.2d 431, 128 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1976); Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194,
539 P.2d 774, 124 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1975).
49. See note 11 supra.
50. For a general development of the irrebutable presumption doctrine, see
generally Turner v. Dep't. of Employment, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) i Cleveland Bd. of Ed-
ucation v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't. of Agric. v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
(Vol. 6:191, 19781 Security for Costs
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
rebutable presumption exists in a situation where, because a ba-
sic fact exists, a presumed fact is deemed to exist. The United
States Supreme Court hadS' invoked the doctrine to fill the gap
left by the two-tiered substantive due process/equal protection
analysis,52 and when the private interests affected were consid-
ered important.53
Beaudreau54 involved students and parents attempting to pros-
ecute a pending action against a school district, the district's su-
645 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); and Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971). The irrebutable presumption doctrine is criticized in Note, Ir-
rebutable Presumption: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975) and Note,
The Irrebutable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1534
(1974).
Bell v. Burson, supra, typifies the admixture of an irrebutable presumption anal-
ysis with a procedural due process analysis. In Bell petitioner challenged the con-
stitutionality of Georgia's Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which provided
that the motor vehicle registration and driver's license of an uninsured motorist
involved in an accident shall be suspended unless a security is posted sufficient to
cover the amount of damages claimed by aggrieved parties in reports of the acci-
dent. At the administrative hearing prior to suspension of driving privileges, no
consideration was given to the questions of the motorist's fault or liability. The
Court held the Georgia scheme unconstitutional, rejecting the presumption that
all uninsured motorists who have been in an accident must deposit sufficient se-
curity to ensure payment of damages claimed against them. But the Court did so
under the guise of procedural due process reasoning. The Court held that in this
case a hearing "appropriate to the nature of the case" necessitates a determina-
tion whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgment in amounts claimed be-
ing rendered against the licensee.
Regarding the recent cases applying an irrebutable presumption analysis in the
context of procedural due process reasoning (e.g., Bell, Vlandis, La Fleur, Murry,
and Turner) it has been commented:
It now seems readily apparent that these cases actually rest on an equal
protection rationale, for the objectionable portion of each law was the way
it classified individuals .... In none of the cases would a "process" have
saved the law because the procedure would only have determined
whether an individual fitted into one of these arbitrary classifications.
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 491 (1978).
51. The irrebutable presumption doctrine has fallen into disrepute. See
generally Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (which limited the irrebutable
presumption doctrine to fundamental rights) and Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (which is interpreted as the final retreat from
the irrebutable presumption doctrine by Comment, The Burger Court's "Newest"
Equal Protection: Irrebutable Presumption Rejected-Two Tier Review Reinstated,
1977 WASH. UNv. L.Q. 15).
52. See generally TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUIONAL LAW, §16-32, at 1092-97
(1978).
53. See id., and United States Dep't. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508.
54. See Statute Requiring Plaintiffs to Post Security for Costs Held Violation of
Procedural Due Process, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1006 (1976) for a succinct discussion of
Beaudreau's application of an irrebutable presumption analysis.
perintendent of schools, and a director of contemporary education
programs without filing an undertaking as prescribed by Califor-
nia Government Code sections 947 and 951. The court recognized
and avowed the purpose of the sections, "to protect the public en-
tities and public employees against the cost of defending frivolous
law suits. . . ."55 Nevertheless, the statute did not adequately
draw into focus the necessity of a security requirement based on
the circumstances of the individual case, but rather, membership
in a statutory class conclusively defined the need for the security
requirement. This was the "crux of the court's dissatisfaction."5 6
Beaudreau rejected the presumption that all public entities or
employees require protection regarding costs incurred in defend-
ing lawsuits.
The language of Gonzales v. Fox57 provides an even stronger
suggestion that an irrebutable presumption has actually been the
basis of the Court's discontent. In Gonzales, California Code of
Civil Procedure section 1030, requiring nonresident plaintiffs to
post a security for costs before being permitted to prosecute an
action against resident defendants, came under attack. In holding
that section unconstitutional, the court noted "a blanket imposi-
tion of security requirements on nonresidents in every case is not
meaningfully directed toward [preventing filing of frivolous law-
suits.]" 58 Gonzales rejected the presumption that all California
defendants are in need of protection regarding costs incurred in
defending lawsuits filed by nonresident plaintiffs.
It thus appears that in Beaudreau and Gonzales an irrebutable
presumption analysis was adopted. As mentioned above, this an-
alytical approach had been used to fill the void left by the sub-
stantive due process and equal protection analysis of the high
court. However, California is not confined to such a rigid frame-
work,5 9 and the California Supreme Court has been more open to
the recognition of new fundamental rights6O and suspect classifi-
55. Beaudreau, 14 Cal. 3d at 450, 635 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
56. Statute Requiring Plaintiffs to Post Security for Costs Held Violation of
Procedural Due Process, supra note 54 at 1012.
57. 68 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 16, 137 Cal. Rptr. 312 (1977).
58. Id. at 18, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 313 (emphasis in original).
59. See generally Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388
(1973). In a footnote, the court noted that recently the United States Supreme
Court had, in certain cases, departed from an "artificial analysis" which accompa-
nies application of the traditional rational basis test, demanding that "statutory
classifications bear some substantial relationship to an actual, not 'constructive'
legislative purpose." Id. at 865 n.7, 506 P.2d at 219, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395. The court
also held that whatever the interpretation of the federal equal protection clause, a
traditional rational basis test was inappropriate "to sustain the present statute in
the face of our state constitutional guarantees." Id. at 866, 506 P.2d at 220, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 396.
60. "IWlhen defining fundamental interests under the California Constitution,
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cations,6 1 thus invoking strict scrutiny. California is also more
prone to the utilization of at least a middle level6 2 test, sometimes
referred to as a rational basis test with bite, 63 a strict rationality
test,64 or an intermediate level of review. 65 No matter what de-
nomination, the standard of review is "poised between the largely
toothless invocation of minimum rationality and the nearly fatal
invocation of strict scrutiny . . ."66 and fills the gap of the two-
tiered approach. The significance of applying an irrebutable pre-
sumption analysis is that the legislature's hands are tied to exact-
ing all but perfect classifications.
B. Procedural due process analysis: A piece in the wrong puzzle
The California decisions have chosen to treat the security for
costs as a protected property interest in itself. This raises a
significant problem. Rather than analyzing whether proper proce-
dural due process is afforded in the litigation of a substantive
claim, the decisions shift to a consideration of whether proper
procedural due process is afforded the very procedure devoted to
the litigation of a substantive claim.67 In other words, the court
uses due process analysis to examine whether the statutes which
provide for a security for costs, a form of due process itself, are
unconstitutional for want of proper procedural due process safe-
guards. The error here is that the guarantee of the due process
we exercise our inherent power as a court of last resort independant of fundamen-
tal interest determinations which may be reached by the United States Supreme
Court solely on interpretation of the Federal Constitution." People v. Olivas, 17
Cal. 3d 236, 246, 551 P.2d 375, 381, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (1976). Pursuant thereto, the
following have been held fundamental right to work or profession (Sall'er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Endler v. Schutz-
bank, 68 Cal. 2d 162, 436 P.2d 297, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968)); holding public office
(Zeilenga v. Nelson, 4 Cal. 3d 716, 484 P.2d 578, 94 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1971)); unanimous
jury verdict in a criminal trial (People v. Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 929, 434 P.2d
623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1967)); unanimous jury verdict under the mentally disor-
dered sex offender law (id).
61. Sex held a suspect classification. Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485
P.2d 259, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
62. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
63. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Hav. L. REV. 1 (1972).
64. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, 87 HARv. L REV. 1, 123 (1973).
65. As phrased in TRmE, AmERicAN CONSTrrunONAL LAW 1082 (1978).
66. Id.
67. For a strong criticism of this shift, See Statute Requiring Plaintiffs to Post
Security for Costs Held Violation of Procedural Due Process, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1006,
1010 (1976).
clause itself is examined under the aegis of procedural due proc-
ess standards.68
1. Recognition of a two-fold property interest
The California decisions have concluded that there is a two-fold
taking manifested by the security for cost requirement.69 Regard-
ing the loss of the use or enjoyment of money,70 the decisions rely
on "Sniadach and its progeny."71 Thus a comparison of Sniadach
and Beaudreau is in order. Sniadach involved a situation in
which petitioner's wages were garnished upon an ex parte motion
without a prior hearing. The Court found this a reprehensible
"taking."72 Beaudreau found a two-fold taking in the requirement
of a security for costs before an action could be prosecuted
against a government entity or employees.73
The two cases do have much in common. Upon an ex parte mo-
tion, one party is deprived of the use of money until a formal pro-
ceeding is commenced. No prior hearing exists to determine the
legitimacy of the claim, nor the reasonableness of the "taking."
68. Id. Cf. Van Alstyne, Cracks in the "New Property" Adjudicative Due Proc-
ess in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 452 (1977):
As the fifth and fourteenth amendments read in fact, due process is not a
protected entitlement. Rather, the protected interests are "life, liberty,
land] property." Due process stands in relation to these not as an
equivalent constitutionally established entitlement, but only as a condi-
tion to be observed insofar as the state may move to imperil one of the
named substantive interests. That is:
No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law ....
69. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
70. A correct analysis of procedural protection for property entails two funda-
mental questions:
1) What constitutes "property"? 2) When is the government depriving
someone of property?
NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTrrUIONAL LAw 490 (1978).
The latter question is "really a state action issue: the due process clauses pro-
tect against governmental, rather than private deprivations of property." Id. The
first question is exceedingly complex. See, e.g., Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L J. 733 (1964); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due
Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L.
REV. 1439 (1968); and Comment, From Goss to Bishop: The Demise of the Entitle-
ment Doctrine, 5 PEPPERDNE L. REv. 523 (1978).
It is beyond the scope of this comment to thoroughly address the two analytical
questions posed above. Therefore the discussion is limited to a critique of the rea-
soning utilized by the California courts in concluding there is a "taking" in this
context.
71. See, e.g., Brooks v. Small Claims Court, 8 Cal. 3d at 677, 504 P.2d at 1253, 105
Cal. Rptr. at 789; Beaudreau, 14 Cal. 3d at 455, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 589;
and Nork, 33 Cal. App. 3d at 1002, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
72. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. at 342.
73. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 457, 535 P.2d at 716-19, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 590-91.
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However, in Sniadach, the substantive claim to be litigated cen-
tered on the right to ownership of the garnished wages. Thus, the
hearing on that issue was summarily decided by the prejudgment
garnishment. The summary procedure preempted the hearing to
be had on that issue. Truly this is a "taking. '74 However, the se-
curity for costs is only a requirement of access to the judicial
process in order to litigate a substantive claim. The security for
costs is not the substantive claim, and therefore the plaintiff has
not been temporarily deprived of the use of the subject of that
claim pending a hearing. The distinction is critical. The procedu-
ral due process requirements called for by Sniadach have signifi-
cance in the litigation of the substantive claim, right to ownership
of wages, and summary denial of its use pending a full hearing on
that claim. California has gone beyond Sniadach in recognizing
that the loss of use or enjoyment of money for the purpose of sat-
isfying a security for cost requirement is a protected interest in
itself. As mentioned above, this in essence is an inspection of the
rights afforded by due process litigation of a substantive claim
couched in terms of due process itself.
The decisions also rest heavily upon an application of Fuentes v.
Shevin.75 However, it is merely the naked rule7 6 of Fuentes which
is applied, and not the rationale. The basis for the decision in
Fuentes was that:
The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of govern-
ment to follow a fair process of decision-making when it acts to deprive a
74. Sniadach represents a rather extreme situation. At issue in Sniadach was
the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment procedure which permitted up to 50% of
a person's wages to be frozen without a prior hearing. The Court noted "'The idea
of wage garnishment in advance of judgment, of trustee process, of wage attach-
ment, or whatever it is called, is a most inhuman doctrine. It compels the wage
earner, trying to keep his family together, to be driven below the poverty level."'
395 U.S. at 340, quoting Congressman Reuss, 114 CONG. REC. 1832 (1968).
75. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
76. The naked rule of Fuentes has been severely criticized:
In sweeping language, Fuentes v. Shetin (citation omitted), enunciated
the principle that the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process
requires an adversary hearing before an individual may be temporarily
deprived of any possessory interest in tangible personal property, how-
ever brief the disposition and however slight his monetary interest in the
property. The Court's decision today withdraws significantly from the full
reach of that principle, and to this extent I think it fair to say that Fuentes
opinion is overruled.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 623 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). While
Fuentes has been limited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions, Justice Powell
was premature in signaling the overruling of Fuentes. See North Georgia Finish-
ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is not only to
ensure abstract fair play to the individual. Its purpose, more particularly,
is to protect his use and possession of his property from arbitrary
encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair or mistaken depriva-
tions of property .... 77
In the context of security for costs requirements, there is no arbi-
trary encroachment upon a person's possession of property, nor is
there a denial of fair play to the individual. The security for costs
is extracted so that important public policies may be furthered:
the protection of innocent defendants by ensuring recovery of
costs and the prevention of frivolous law suits.
Regarding the second aspect of the two-fold taking, the dismis-
sal of a meritorious claim, the decisions have applied the Board of
Regents v. Roth "legitimate claim of entitlement" test in deter-
mining the existence of a property interest within the meaning of
the due process clauses. 78 The Beaudreau court summarily con-
cluded that "[a I meritorious action against a public entity or pub-
lic employee clearly connotes a 'legitimate claim of entitlement'
within the meaning of Roth."79
That a meritorious8 O action is not a property interest is difficult
to conceive. For example, a chose in action may be attached by a
creditor.81
However, a "meritorious action" exists within the framework of
the procedure established to litigate a substantive claim. Without
the judicial system a plaintiff could not obtain a money judgment.
Therefore a plaintiff has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to a
money judgment so long as he has a potentially meritorious claim
and has complied with all the procedural prerequisites to the liti-
gation of the claim. For example, should the plaintiff neglect to
fie his action before the statute of limitations has run he would
no longer have a "legitimate claim of entitlement." Likewise, if a
plaintiff fails to comply with a security for costs requirement, a
longstanding element of recognized procedure requisite to the liti-
gation, of a substantive claim, the plaintiff no longer maintains a
"legitimate claim of entitlement."
77. 407 U.S. at 80-81 (emphasis added).
78. "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it .... He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 456, 535 P.2d
718, 121'Cal. Rptr. at 590 citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
79. Id. at 457, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
80. The etymon of "meritorious" is "that brings in money." WEBSTER's THID
NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1414 (1971).
81. CAI. CIV. PROC. CODE §487.010(2) (West Supp. 1978).
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2. Implications of the California Position
The implications of the California position are significant.8 2 The
effect upon an already backlogged judicial system and the ques-
tionable ability of the legislature to deter frivolous claims present
two very formidable problems. The Beaudreau court noted deter-
ence of frivolous lawsuits may well be a proper concern, and that
the security for costs is not necessarily an improper method of ef-
fectuating this purpose. Nevertheless, "since this method sub-
jects the plaintiff to a taking of his property, it must satisfy due
process principals. This it fails to do."83 Due process thus neces-
sitates a prior hearing to determine whether a claim is, in fact,
frivolous. If the claim is then found to lack substantiality, the se-
curity requirement is in order. In Beaudreau, the court noted
"[tIhe delay occasioned by a prior due process hearing would not
interfere with the state's interest in detering unmeritorious litiga-
tion, as the hearing would be designed to bring to light actions
lacking merit before proceeding further with them."84 The prob-
lem with the court's reasoning is apparent. Part of the legislative
purpose was to deter frivolous suits, thus preventing congestion
of the courts. Yet now a hearing must be afforded to determine
whether in fact the policy considerations exist.85
California's most reasonable view is expressed in Vinnicombe v.
State.8 6 In Vinnicombe, the court addressed itself to the constitu-
tionality of the predecessor to sections 947 and 951 of California
82. For example, what are to be the effects on the necessity of a security for
costs regarding the granting of a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order? In these cases, such a security is a significant protection afforded a defend-
ant. This is discussed in depth in the textual material part C infra.
83. Beaudreau, 14 Cal. 3d at 464, 535 P.2d at 723, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 595.
84. Id.
85. It may be contended that a brief hearing would not aggravate the current
court backlog. The author takes the position that any additional workload cast on
the courts must of necessity enlarge the congestion of the courts.
86. 172 Cal. App. 2d 54, 341 P.2d 705 (1959). See also Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co.,
42 Cal. 2d 11, 265 P.2d 1 (1954), which held the security for costs requirement, as a
limitation upon the right of a stockholder to maintain a derivative suit, a reason-
able limitation; Boyer v. County of Contra Costa, 235 Cal. App. 2d 111, 45 Cal. Rptr.
58 (1965), which upheld the security for costs requirement in a wrongful death ac-
tion against a public entity; Stafford v. People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works, 195
Cal. App. 2d 148, 15 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1961), which upheld the statute requiring a se-
curity for costs as a condition precedent to the prosecution of a quiet title action
as against the state; Rio Vista Gas Assn. v. California, 188 Cal. App. 2d 555, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 559 (1961), which held a cost bond may be required in inverse condemnation
proceedings against the state; and Standahl v. Splivalo, 13 Cal. App. 2d 85, 56 P.2d
298 (1936), affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's action by summarily applying statu-
Code of Civil Procedure, held unconstitutional in Beaudreau. The
court held these sections 87 to be reasonable provisions to protect
the state against the costs and expenses of defending unfounded
and baseless claims.8 8 The Vinnicombe court noted that the legis-
lature may enact reasonable regulations as to the enforcement of
a substantive claim, "so long as the right itself is not curtailed or
its exercise unreasonably burdened."89 Thus, the Vinnicombe
court correctly addressed itself to the issue of whether the overall
procedure was consistent with norms of "integrity and fundamen-
tal fairness." Several other jurisdictions have manifested adop-
tion of the Vinnicombe position, holding the security for costs to
be consistent with the fair adjudication of a substantive claim.90
IMl. AVOIDING ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
At least one commentator has lauded the innovative California
position,9 1 but this position may be untenable not withstanding
the above criticism. Several other California statutes contain se-
curity for costs provisions. For the purposes of this comment, the
most notable of these statutes concern preliminary injunctions92
and temporary restraining orders (TRO's).93 These security re-
quirements are imposed to protect a defendant from adverse ef-
tory provisions requiring a security for costs in the presentation of negligence
claims against the state.
87. CAL. Gov'r CODE §§16041, 16047 (repealed 1959).
88. Vinnicombe, 172 Cal. App. 2d at 57, 341 P.2d at 707.
89. Id. at 77, 341 P.2d at 707 (emphasis in original).
90. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Plymouth Township, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 320 A.2d
444 (1974) (which upheld what might be considered an exhorbitant bond in order
to maintain an appeal contesting the development of neighboring land); State ex
rel. Reece v. Gies, 198 S.E. 2d 211 (Supe. Ct. W. Va. 1973) (bond requirement in an
amount double that of a judgment rendered against the tenant for damages and an
amount sufficient to cover the rent for one year held constitutional as bearing a
reasonable relation to the amount that may be subject to recovery under the bond
if the landlord prevails on appeal); Houston v. Brown, 292 So. 2d 911 (La. App.
1970) (bond requirement in double the amount of reparation awarded against ap-
pellant pursuant to Perishable Agriculture Commodities Act upheld); O'Day v.
George Arakelian Farms, Inc., 536 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the state
may properly condition the right to appeal upon posting security sufficient to pro-
tect an appellee from loss of damages already awarded, interest, and costs on ap-
peal, including reasonable attorney's fee; but that a double bond requirement is
not rationally related to the effectuation of such a purpose); and Bowman v.
Waldt, 9 Wash. App. 562, 513 P.2d 559 (1973) (requirement of filing fees and indem-
nity bond as a condition to maintaining suit on judgment debtor's property held
constitutional).
91. See Bond Requirements Imposed Upon Plaintiffs Suing Public Entities
Held to Violate Due Process When No Prior Hearing Is Provided to Determine Ne-
cessity or Reasonableness of Bond, 21 VnuL. L. REV. 282, 290 (1976).
92. CA. CIrv. PROC. CODE §529 (West 1954) provides an undertaking is re-
quired prior to the granting of an injunction. This includes the preliminary injunc-
tion. See generally Griffin v. Lima, 124 Cal. App. 2d 697, 269 P.2d 191 (1954).
93. CA.. CIV. PROC. CODE §513.010 (West Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 6:191, 19781 Security for Costs
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
fects of such summary procedures. There also exists a strong
policy of deterring frivolous claims, and ensuring that the re-
strained party may recover losses (costs) incurred pending a
hearing. There exists a quid pro quo. The plaintiff sacrifices the
use of a security; the defendant sacrifices the enjoyment of a right
or privilege.94 It would be ironic indeed if the developing law in
California, which was given birth by Sniadach and Fuentes,
95
causes the rejection of the needed protection for those subject to
a preliminary injunction or TRO.
The code sections which impose the security for cost require-
ment in the context of either a preliminary injunction or a TRO
provide the party who is required to furnish it no opportunity to
contest the necessity or amount of such security nor the ability of
the party to furnish it.96 The security for costs is required without
a prior hearing,97 and the amount is fixed.98 Only the person en-
94. For a good discussion and illustration, see Driscoll v. Plymouth Township,
14 Pa. Comm. W. Ct. 404, 320 A.2d 444.
95. In Fuentes, the prejudgment replevin laws, found unconstitutional for fail-
ure to adequately protect the debtor's right of due process by not providing a pre-
deprivation hearing, required a security bond to be posted. This bond require-
ment alone was insufficient protection of the debtor's rights.
96. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §513.010 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
(b) A temporary restraining order may issue ex parte if all of the follow-
ing are found:...
(2) the plaintiff has provided an undertaking as required in Section
515.010.
CAI. Crv. PROC. CODE §515.010 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
The court shall not issue a restraining order or a writ of possession until
the plaintiff has filed with the court a written undertaking. The undertak-
ing shall provide that the sureties are bound to the defendant in the
amount of the undertaking for the return of the property to the defendant,
if return thereof be ordered, and for the payment to him of any sum he
may recover against plaintiff. The undertaking shall be executed by two
or more sufficient sureties in an amount not less than twice the value of
the property as determined by the court.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §529 (West 1954) provides:
On granting an injunction, the court or judge must require ... a written
undertaking on the part of the applicant ... to the effect that he will pay
to the party enjoined such damages, not exceeding an amount to be speci-
fied as such party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the court
finally decides that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Within five
days after the service of the injunction, the person enjoined may except to
the sufficiency of the sureties, and unless within five days thereafter, upon
notice of not less than two days to the person enjoined, such sureties, or
others in their place, justify before a judge of the court, or the clerk
thereof, at a time and place designated in such notice, the order granting
the injunction must be dissolved.
97. Id.
98. The security for cost must be an amount equal to such damages as the en-
joined may challenge the sufficiency of the security for costs.99
The loss of use or enjoyment of money as either a nonrefund-
able premium or as collateral for a surety in the context of the se-
curity for costs is now well established as a "taking" and thus a
protected property interest. 00 To be a constitutional taking, there
must be compliance with the requisite procedural safeguards dic-
tated by the particular circumstances.l 0
The decisions recognize that once there is a "taking," due proc-
ess requires some form of notice and a hearing1 02 "Absent ex-
traordinary circumstances... the hearing must take place before
an individual is deprived of a significant property interest."103
However, the court will weigh competing interests to determine
whether a hearing, consistent with due process, may take place
after the security for costs is required. 04 In the context of a pre-
liminary injunction or TRO, because of the significant need of pro-
tecting an enjoined party, this balance would likely be struck in
favor of permitting the hearing after the security requirement has
been met. This conclusion is consistent with recent decisions in
other analagous situations.
In TM. Cobb Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 05 the court held
that the summary procedure for seizure of unsecured property to
enforce payment of taxes constituted a "taking" subject to re-
quirements of due process, but that sufficient interests justified
the procedure. 0 6 Specifically, the court held that if a hearing
were granted before the seizure, an assessee would not be pre-
vented from dissipating his or her assets and impeding the collec-
tion of taxes owed. In other words, the substantial government
interest in collection of taxes justified the summary procedure.
joined party may incur by reason of the injunction if the action is for a preliminary
injunction, or not less than twice the value of the property as determined by the
court if a TRO is sought. Id.
99. Id.
100. See part I supra.
101. This is, of course, only if a "taking" is found. By the binding force of stare
decisis, surely such a conclusion must be drawn. However, this does not alter the
author's conclusion that a "taking" in this context is an inappropriate legal conclu-
sion because of the misapplication of Sniadach and Fuentes. See discussion part
II supra.
102. "We start with the basic proposition that in every case involving a depriva-
tion of property within the purview of the due process clause, the Constitution re-
quires some form of notice and a hearing." Beaudreau, 14 Cal. 3d at 458, 535 P. 2d
at 719, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. See Comment, Due Process and Security for Expense Statutes: An Analysis
of California Statutes in Light of Recent Trends, 7 PAC. LJ. 176 (1976).
105. 16 Cal. 3d 606, 547 P.2d 431, 128 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1976).
106. Id. The statute was found unconstitutional on other grounds, specifically
that it authorized the sale of seized property without affording the taxpayer a
prior administrative hearing.
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This case is analagous to the situation created by a plaintiff seek-
ing a preliminary injunction or TRO. In these situations a defend-
ant is deprived of the unfettered enjoyment of a right. In Cobb,
the assessees were likewise deprived of the use and enjoyment of
the seized property. The only hindrance to drawing a complete
analogy is that whereas in Cobb there was a substantial
government interest, in the context of the preliminary injunction
or TRO there is a substantial governmental interest in the protec-
tion of a private interest. Nonetheless, these are exigent circum-
stances which demand some sort of protection to the party to be
restrained, and this protection is partially provided by the secur-
ity for costs.1 0 7
Connolly Development, Inc. v. Superior CourtlO8 also applied a
balancing analysis to determine whether sufficient interest neces-
sitated a post deprivation hearing. In Connally the court held
that:
IT] he recordation of a mechanic's lien, or the filing of a stop notice, inflicts
upon the owner only a minimal deprivation of property; that the laborer
and materialman have an interest in the specific property subject to the
lien since their work and materials have enhanced the value of that prop-
erty and that state policy strongly supports the preservation of laws
which give the laborer and materialman security for their claims.109
Again the analogy is clear.1 10 There is only a minimal deprivation
to the plaintiff, albeit of a recognized property interest, and there
are strong reasons to hold the hearing after the security for costs
is required.
Thus the decisions recognize that once there is a "taking," some
type of notice and a hearing is required. Absent "extraordinary
circumstances," the hearing must be afforded before the taking
107. The summary procedure is needed in order to prevent "irreparable harm,"
a prerequisite to such remedies. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §526 (West 1954) and
C L CIv. PRoc. CODE §513.010 (West Supp. 1978). Therefore dissolution of these
remedies is not in order. Rather, needed protection is afforded the defendant by
the bond requirements.
108. 17 Cal. 3d 803, 535 P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976).
109. Id. at 827, 553 P.2d at 653, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
110. The technical analogy would be that a post deprivation hearing is not re-
quired. This conclusion would pivot on whether the "taking" manifest in security
for costs requirement is as minimal a deprivation as the recordation of a mechan-
ic's lien and whether the public policy supporting the security for costs in the con-
text of the preliminary injunction or TRO is as strong as that which supports the
mechanic's lien or stop notice law. The author would contend this is a viable and
logical conclusion, but this point has not been elaborated because of the court's
apparent hostility toward the security for costs requirement, at least without some
form of a hearing as to its propriety.
occurs. However, the court will make "an appropriate accommo-
dation of the competing interest involved""' to determine
whether the hearing may be after the taking. It is posited that
sufficient extraordinary circumstances exist in the context of the
preliminary injunction and TRO to appropriately accommodate
such interests by allowing a post deprivation hearing.
The statutes as they now read must be construed to be uncon-
stitutional if the court is to be consistent in its determination that
the security for costs requirement constitutes a two-fold taking.
Of course the court could decline to find a protected property in-
terest, or that a hearing is required, but stare decisis precludes
this. Thus the statutes must be revised to provide for a hearing
which would allow the party required to file the security for costs
an opportunity to contest the necessity of the security, as well as
its amount. Most likely this hearing can properly be held after
the party has filed the security for costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The recent California cases which have dealt with the validity
of the security for costs requirements of various California stat-
utes in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions re-
garding the denial of procedural due process in summary remedy
situations are truly "innovative." While it might appear that the
decisions have misapplied Sniadach, the decisions represent Cal-
ifornia's own view as to what constitutes a "taking," and the pro-
tections which must therefore be afforded." 2 In other words, the
decisions go beyond Sniadach, but are consistent with other
trends in California law.
The court will view any security for costs requirement as a tak-
ing for which a hearing must be afforded. The court will weigh
competing interests to determine whether the hearing may, con-
sistent with due process, be granted after the initial deprivation.
It is contended that in such extraordinary situations as the pre-
liminary injunction or TRO, the security requirement will be sus-
tained as a protective mechanism to a defendant to such action
provided the legislature will revise these sections to provide for a
hearing after the security for costs requirement has been met. At
this hearing there should be a consideration of (1) the need for
the security for costs (i.e., whether the defendant will incur dam-
ages); (2) the amount of damages likely to be suffered, and conse-
111. Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 209, 539 P.2d 774, 785, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 25 (1975).
112. See generally, Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) and Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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quently the amount of the security for costs; and (3) the ability of
the party to furnish the security for costs.113
JEREL L. ELLINGTON
113. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.

